


# **Sky Marshals On Board**

Presented By  
Offer Einav



# Foreword




- 9/11 – the aviation security watershed
- The need for SM
- SM public debate
- SM objections (political & legal issues, pilot association,)
- Implementation models



# SM Dilemmas

- Threat assessment & specific information
- Evaluation of on-board situation
- The individual situation vs. Team situation
- Rule of Engagements =>justification
- Combat tactics
- How to resolve the situation ?
- When to counteractions ?
- Identification of terror threat vs. Disruptive Passenger



# Terrorists advantages

- Hijacker vs. Suicide
- Unknown number of terrorists
- Terrorists' "Modes Operandi":
  - Firearms, explosive, IED, Chemicals
  - Improvised "weaponry tools"
  - Barehanded combat tactics
- Terrorists' tactics
  - Decide / deception
  - Uncover the Sky Marshals
  - "On-board turmoil" advanced provocation acts



# Mid-Air suicide bomber

- 9/11 Scenario – Hijacked for Air Ground Missiles
- Suicide Scenario - Mid Air Explosions
- “Modes Operandi”:
  - Methods to concealed bomb components
  - Forms/shapes of IED’s:  
(shoes, liquid, cosmetic, diapers)
  - Onboard assembly of IED



# SM Counter Measures



## Escalation levels

### ● 9/11 Scenario

- Control of the cabin
- Cockpit door – (last line of defense)
- Killing the crew and “self flying”- towards ground targets

### ● Suicide bomber Scenario

- Identification of terrorist
- Identification of terrorist group
- bomb assembly



# Case study:

## AA 942 MIA– ORL (Dec 9, 2005)

- Plane at gate
- Passenger Rigoberto Alpizar begins acting erratically
- Then runs up the aisle towards the cockpit
- Run out of the cabin to the jet-way

## Results

- unarmed, mentally unstable passenger shot & killed by two FAM's !!!

## Lesson learned



# Legal issues and polices

- Law enforcement vs. dedicated SM
- Prevention of LE “mix” duties vs. SM procedures
- SM operational policy - clear and precise
- SM collaboration with pilots & cabin crew
- Clear distinguish between crew’s Disruptive Passenger procedures vs. SM Rule of Engagements



# SM – Crew interface

The general “thumb-rule”

- SM responsibility – to combat and neutralize onboard terror attacks
- Crew responsibility – to dismantle, apprehend & control disruptive passengers
- SM & Crew mutual support => “common procedures”
- SM duties / principle actions / potential results MUST embedded into airline CRM program
- FA procedures Shouldn't uncover SM



# SM Training



- The disruptive passenger - medical issues, mental illness symptoms, physiological reactions, etc
- Effective tools to identify disruptive behaviors
- Simulation and tactical drills
- Airline, Cabin Crew and S/M mutual training

## Notice

- Emphasize the balance between SM counter terrorism duties and crew procedures to control Disruptive Passenger
- Make sure that collaboration with crew - will not uncover SM

# On-board Technology



- Communication system; SM  $\Leftrightarrow$  SM , SM  $\Leftrightarrow$  crew and SM  $\Leftrightarrow$  Ground
- Sensors; explosive, BCRN, Jamming, communication
- Pre Determined Indicator (PDI); Video surveillance, Face recognition
- APS & pre flight information
- TARMS
- SAFEE



**Thank you**

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